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SECTION 707(b) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: A ROADMAP
WITH A PROPOSED STANDARD
FOR DEFINING SUBSTANTIAL
ABUSE
On July 10, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.' This
Act adds a new section to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code2
governing the discharge of consumer debts.3 The new section,
707(b), states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion
and not at the request or suggestion of any party in in-
terest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer
debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a
substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There
shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief re-
quested by the debtor.'
This section is the result of a long political battle between the
consumer credit industry and those favoring the discharge of
consumer debts without creditor harassment. After the passage
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,' the credit industry ex-
perienced a sharp increase in losses from the discharge of con-
sumer debts. The credit industry pressured Congress to disallow
discharge for consumers with sufficient income to pay their
debts in the future.8 The Bankruptcy Code had not previously
allowed a debtor's future income to determine eligibility for
discharge.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 [hereinafter cited as the 1984 Act] (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
3. Id. § 707(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter cited as the 1978 Act] (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 35-68.
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The credit industry persuaded Congress to introduce bills that
recognized a debtor's future income as an element in determin-
ing whether to discharge consumer debts.7 These bills met stiff
resistance from consumer groups. After three years of debate,
Congress deleted the "future income" language from bills under
consideration and adopted section 707(b).
Section 707(b) raises a number of troubling questions. First,
what did Congress mean by "primarily consumer debts"? Sec-
ond, how should a bankruptcy court decide when to make "its
own motion"? What happens if a "party in interest" makes a
motion despite section 707(b)'s prohibition? Third, and most
importantly, what is "substantial abuse," and how does the
"presumption" in favor of the debtor operate?8
7. See infra note 56.
8. In the recent case of In re Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986), a bank-
ruptcy court raised a number of questions regarding the constitutional validity of
§ 707(b). While a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by § 707(b) is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is nevertheless important to understand § 707(b)'s potential consti-
tutional infirmities.
The first constitutional issue raised by the Keniston court regarding § 707(b) is that of
denial of equal protection of the laws. According to the court:
[There is n]o rational basis for distinction between "consumer" debtors and
other debtors seeking chapter 7 bankruptcy relief ....
The result is that a debtor having a personal injury judgment, or a debtor
having debts primarily related to business activity, is entitled to Chapter 7 relief
and discharge of his debts, with no questions asked as to his ability to repay,
while the "consumer" debtor is required to establish that he cannot pay off his
debts under some extended payment plan before he can obtain the same relief.
Id. at 744-45.
Contrary to the court's view, one can offer a rational basis for distinguishing between
consumer and nonconsumer debtors. The consumer debtor voluntarily incurs debt to
purchase goods for personal use. See infra text accompanying notes 73-87. In other
words, the consumer debtor purposefully avails himself of the benefits of the credit sys-
tem. An individual with a personal injury debt, however, does not voluntarily seek the
aid of creditors to enhance his personal lifestyle. This fact alone seems sufficient to jus-
tify a difference in treatment.
But this rationale does not explain why business debtors should be treated differently
from consumer debtors. The Purdue Study, however, does supply a rationale. See infra
notes 156-57 and accompanying text. This study, conducted by the Krannert Graduate
School of Business Administration, concluded that a substantial number of consumer
debtors who filed for personal bankruptcy could have repaid their debts in full over a
three-year period. See S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1982). Because con-
sumer debtors were discharging debt that could have been repaid, Congress was justified
in singling them out for special treatment.
Other constitutional questions raised by the Keniston court include the following:
(1) Does the statute deny procedural due process by constituting the judicial
officer who must decide the ultimate question of the debtor's right to bank-
ruptcy relief as in effect "accuser" or "prosecutor" initiating the complaint
against the debtor?
(2) Is the requisite "case and controversy" requirement for federal jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution present when no other party besides the
court itself has raised any issue or dispute requiring judicial determination?
(3) If this statute is construed to require the judicial officer to review all bank-
mrtnv notitlnna to ,
4
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This Note examines these questions and proposes a standard
for determining "substantial abuse." Part I provides an overview
of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Part II discusses the legis-
lative history of section 707(b). Part III examines the jurisdic-
tional and procedural questions raised by the section and at-
tempts to define what Congress meant by "primarily consumer
debts" and "on [a court's] own motion." Part IV proposes a two-
part standard for determining "substantial abuse." This stan-
dard suggests that courts should find "substantial abuse" when-
ever a debtor acts in bad faith or is able to repay 100% of his
debts over the three-year period following his motion for
bankruptcy.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY s
Before examining the mechanics of section 707(b), it is impor-
tant to understand the basics of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. This Part provides a general overview of how the con-
sumer bankruptcy provisions operate.
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code has two goals: to liquidate
debtors' assets for creditors and to give debtors a fresh start.10
Chapter 7 provides a straightforward system for achieving these
goals.
Most Chapter 7 cases are filed voluntarily by the debtor." To
file, a debtor submits to the court a bankruptcy petition, a state-
ment of financial affairs and schedule of assets and liabilities,1 2 a
ing objection and possible denial of bankruptcy relief, does the placing of that
review and processing function with a judicial officer violate the separation of
powers doctrine inherent in the Constitution?
(4) Is there a violation of substantive due process by the arguably vague lan-
guage of this statute giving no standard for its application and apparently indi-
cating "abuse" of the bankruptcy laws is permissible but "substantial abuse" is
not?
60 Bankr. at 745 (emphasis in original). While these questions are provocative and inter-
esting, it is unlikely that § 707(b) will be declared unconstitutional because of the well-
established principle that federal courts should try to avoid declaring a statute unconsti-
tutional wherever possible. Id.
9. The discussion in this Part draws heavily from R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDA-
xrrALs § 1.03 (1985).
10. Id.; see also J.J. WHIrE. BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 29 (1985).
11. R. AARON, supra note 9, § 1.03, at 1-9.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (Supp. II 1984); BANKR. R. 1002, 1007(b); see also A. HERZOG,
S. LOWE & J. ZWEIBEL, HERZOG's BANKRUPTCY FORMS AND PRACTICE, Forms 2.01, 2.25-
2.26, §§ 1.03, 1.06 (7th ed. 1984).
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schedule of current income and current expenditures, 13 and an
acknowledgement by the debtor that he was informed of the
availability of Chapter 13 relief."' The debtor also pays a sixty
dollar filing fee.' 5
Once the debtor files a petition, three important things occur.
First, an automatic stay takes effect to preclude almost all ac-
tions against the debtor and his property. 6 Second, the court
appoints an interim trustee to administer the debtor's estate. 7
Third, all listed creditors are notified and invited to a First
Meeting of Creditors,'" usually held within thirty days of the fil-
ing, to ask questions and ensure that the debtor's assets are ac-
curately disclosed.' The creditors may also replace the interim
trustee with a trustee of their election.20
Upon the filing of the petition, the trustee begins to assemble
and liquidate the debtor's property.2 1 Debtors may exempt cer-
tain household property from collection and liquidation by the
trustee.22 Most consumer bankruptcies yield no assets for distri-
bution to the creditors.2 3
Before discharging a petitioner's debts, the court holds a dis-
charge hearing24 to consider any reaffirmation agreements.25 The
court will then typically grant discharge. A discharge order voids
any personal judgment against the debtor and enjoins future at-
tempts to collect discharged debt.26
13. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (Supp. II 1984).
14. Id. § 342(b). To obtain Chapter 13 relief a debtor must be an "individual with
regular income" as that term is defined by § 101(27) of the amended Bankruptcy Code.
To qualify for Chapter 13 relief the debtor must owe only noncontingent, liquidated,
unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of
less than $350,000. See J.J. WHITE, supra note 10, at 36.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) (1982).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. II 1984).
17. Id. § 701 (1982); BANKR. R. 2001.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1982); BANKR. R. 2002-2003.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (Supp. II 1984); BANKR. R. 2004(b).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); BANKR. R. 2006, 2009.
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); BANKR. R. 6001-6010.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). Exemptions provided for include the
debtor's residence, one motor vehicle, household furnishings, unmatured life insurance
contracts, health aids, and social security, veterans', disability, and pension benefits.
23. R. AARON, supra note 9, § 1.03, at 1-12. The fact that most consumer bankrupt-
cies yield no distributable assets explains why creditors are interested in preventing
debtors from entering the Chapter 7 process.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d) (Supp. II 1984); BANKR. R. 4008.
25. A reaffirmation agreement is an agreement between debtor and creditor that oth-
erwise dischargeable debts will be enforced after bankruptcy. R. AARON, supra note 9,
§ 1.03, at 1-12.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
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In rare cases, a court will deny a debtor the relief of discharge.
Discharge may be denied for fraud,2 7 concealment of property,28
failure to obey court orders, 29 refusal to respond to questions
concerning financial affairs,30 and now for "substantial abuse" of
the provisions of Chapter 7.31 Discharge will also be denied if the
debtor has filed for Chapter 7 relief within the past six years.
32
More commonly, discharge will be granted with certain debts ex-
empted from discharge.33 The most prominent exemptions are
for money loaned in reliance on false financial statements, fam-
ily support obligations, credit card spending sprees, drunk driv-
ing judgments, student loans, and recent tax obligations.3 4
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 707(b)
To understand the language of section 707(b), the section's or-
igins must be explored. In 1978, Congress enacted the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act." The 1978 Act represented the first major
revision of the federal bankruptcy laws since 1938,38 and argu-
ably removed many disincentives to filing for personal bank-
ruptcy.3 7
In the eighteen-month period following the 1978 amend-
ments,3" Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings increased 103 % .31 Legisla-
tors and experts disagreed about the correlation between the
new law and the surge in filings.' 0 In early 1981, two ideologi-
27. Id. § 727(a)(4) (1982).
28. Id. § 727(a)(2).
29. Id. § 727(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 707(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
32. Id. § 727(a)(8).
33. R. AARON, supra note 9, § 1.03, at 1-12.1.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984); BANKR. R. 4007.
35. 1978 Act, supra note 5.
36. See S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
S. REP.].
37. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-42 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Professor Jonathan Landers, University of
Illinois Law School). Professor Landers stated that the 1978 Act made it cheaper to file
for bankruptcy, provided broad exemptions that allow filers to keep most of their prop-
erty after filing, made more debts dischargeable, provided for greater restrictions on
postpetition collection efforts by creditors, and reduced the stigma associated with filing
for bankruptcy by changing the name of filers from "bankrupts" to "debtors." Id.
38. The 1978 Act became effective on October 1, 1979.
39. 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 3.
40. See, e.g., id. at 53 (minority views of Sen. Metzenbaum and Sen. Kennedy on
S. 2000). The Senators wrote: "As several witnesses at hearings on S. 2000 pointed out,
the increase in our current bankruptcies corresponds to an increase in credit outstand-
ing, in interest rates, in unemployment and in greater consumer awareness as a result of
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cally opposed groups emerged in the debate over this unprece-
dented increase in filings.
Members of one group, the consumer credit industry, ap-
peared before congressional committees from 1981 to 1983. Rep-
resentatives from banks, credit unions, and retailers testified to
the enormous losses 41 engendered by the increase in bankruptcy
filings.2 The credit industry argued that their increased losses
would lead to higher loan rates. 3 Persons most in need of credit
might therefore be unable to obtain it through legal channels."
To decrease bankruptcy filings, the consumer credit industry
proposed that the future earnings of debtors be considered in
determining eligibility for Chapter 7 relief.45 Consumer creditors
argued that consideration of future income would comport with
actual lending practices 4" and also would encourage debtors to
repay their obligations to the extent they were able to do so.47
The other group was comprised of the legal aid and civil rights
communities,"4 bankruptcy judges and scholars,' 9 and many leg-
attorney advertising on the subject of individual bankruptcy rights." Id.
But see id. at 3 (majority view): "The startling increase in the number of bankruptcies
since the code went into effect (which past experience suggests is out of proportion to the
changes in other economic indicators) does not permit the committee to attribute the
rise solely to economic conditions."
41. Losses were estimated at $6 billion in 1981. Id. at 6.
42. See 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 37.
43. See id. at 170; see also 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 6.
44. "[Tlhe people most in need of credit may be driven to illegal lenders." 1982
S. REP., supra note 36, at 6.
45. See, e.g., 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 42. Professor Landers testified:
"Our major recommendation is that future income be allocated to the payment of prepe-
tition debts to the extent reasonably possible. In other words, our major proposal is that
debts only be dischargeable insofar as they cannot reasonably be paid out of future
income."
46. "The typical lender expects to get repaid from the income generated by a bor-
rower who continued to work and pay his debts. The typical lender does not extend
credit on the assumption that it will be repaid out of liquidation of assets." Id. at 10
(testimony of Andrew F. Brimmer, President, Brimmer and Co.); see also 1982 S. REP.,
supra note 36, at 14:
The present Bankruptcy Code looks only to the debtor's ability to pay debts
out of present assets, and requires the debtor to surrender his nonexempt assets
as a condition of bankruptcy relief. In contrast, consumer credit is not extended
against the liquidation value of present assets, but rather, on the assumption
that the debts will be paid out of future income. As presently structured, then,
the Bankruptcy Code is at odds with the modern trends in the consumer finance
industry.
47. See Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: Analysis and Proposal for
Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 281 (1981).
48. See Bankruptcy Improvements Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 175-251 (1983) (testimony of Irwin Trauss, staff attor-
ney, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.; Matthew J. Mason, Detroit Pro-
gram Director, Chrysler Corp. Hourly Workers Legal Services Plan, United Auto Work-
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islators, the most vociferous of whom were Senators Metzen-
baum and Kennedy. 0 This group, committed to the view that
the bankruptcy laws should give debtors a "fresh start," 1 ar-
gued that the increase in filings resulted from economic reces-
sion, high interest rates, and an overextension of credit.52 The
group raised three objections to a future income test. First, they
argued that such a restriction would prejudice lower income
families who, through no fault of their own, were unable to meet
their financial obligations.5 3 Second, they argued that such a test
would impose high administrative burdens on bankruptcy courts
by forcing judges to speculate on the earning capacities of peti-
tioners. 4 Third, they argued that a future income test would re-
sult in perverse incentives for both debtors and creditors. Credi-
tors, knowing that discharge is difficult, might make riskier
loans. Debtors, realizing that eligibility for Chapter 7 relief de-
pends on their future income, might quit their jobs.5
ers; and Althea T.L. Simmons, Director, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, Washington, D.C. Bureau).
49. See, e.g., id. at 202 (testimony of Judge Joe Lee, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Eastern
District of New York); see also id. at 322-426 (testimony of Professor Philip Shuchman,
Rutgers University Law School, and Professor Frank R. Kennedy, University of Michi-
gan Law School).
50. See 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 49 (minority views of Sen. Metzenbaum and
Sen. Kennedy on S. 2000).
51. The idea that the purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to give debtors a fresh start
comes from the Supreme Court's language in Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904):
"Systems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
indebtedness which has become oppressive and to permit him to have a fresh start in
business or commercial life, freed from the obligation and responsibilities which may
have resulted from business misfortunes."
52. See 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 57 (minority views of Sen. Metzenbaum and
Sen. Kennedy on S. 2000).
53. See id. Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy pointed out that studies have shown
that the vast majority of bankruptcies involve blue-collar workers who have suffered fi-
nancial reversals such as unemployment, uninsured illness, or divorce. They argued that
to deny these people a fresh start by requiring them to pay off their debts over a three to
five year period "is not too far from involuntary servitude." Id. at 59. According to the
Senators, debtors, under a future income test, would have to undergo the "lengthy, com-
plicated, and tremendously demeaning task of demonstrating that they are too poor to
meet their obligations." Id. at 49.
54. See id. at 59-62..
S. 2000 will require bankruptcy judges to make determinations that they are
ill-equipped to make about debtors' future earning capacity and future expenses.
The bill would require these judges to make highly speculative judgments ini-
tially about what debtors' anticipated living expenses are and what their future
employment prospects are. It then requires the judge to determine whether a
reasonable portion of their debts can be paid off in light of the financial situa-
tion hypothesized. Such a test raises more questions than it answers.
Id. at 59-60.
55. Id. at 62.
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The consumer credit industry initially succeeded in including
a future income test in proposed bankruptcy reform bills. In late
1981, members of the House and Senate introduced companion
bills that proposed denying Chapter 7 relief to those individuals
who could pay a "reasonable portion of [their] debts out of an-
ticipated future income.""' From October 1981 to April 1983,
Congress held extensive hearings on these bills."
As of early April 1983, the future income test was still a part
of the proposed amendments.5 8 Yet when S. 445," the primary
Senate reform bill containing a "future income" test, was re-
ported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 26, 1983, the
"future income" language had been deleted.60 There is no expla-
nation in the legislative history of why the "future income" lan-
guage was deleted. In place of the "future income" language ap-
peared a new section-the precursor to section 707(b)-with
language prohibiting discharge for "substantial abuse."61 S. 445
56. H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), reprinted in Personal Bankruptcy: Over-
sight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 845, 846 (1981-1982) [hereinafter
cited as House Oversight Hearings]. H.R. 4786 was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives in October 1981.
In December 1981, S. 2000 was introduced in the Senate. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REc. 32,195 (1981). This bill was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee
in May 1982 over the strong objections of Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy. 1982
S. REP., supra note 36, at 49-68 (minority views on S. 2000).
While both H.R. 4786 and S. 2000 proposed denying recovery to debtors who could
pay "a reasonable portion of [their] debts out of anticipated future income," H.R. 4786,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in House Oversight Hearings, supra, at 846,
S. 2000, unlike H.R. 4786, attempted to define the terms "reasonable portion of debts"
and "anticipated future income." 127 CONG. REc. at 32,195. S. 2000 also added a clause
stating that the threshold test for Chapter 7 eligibility would not apply if the court
found that it would impose undue hardship on the debtor and his dependents. Id. The
language in S. 2000 was incorporated verbatim into S. 445, which was entitled "The Om-
nibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983." S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REc. S1047 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983).
57. Hearings from 1981 until 1983 included: 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 37;
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Future Earnings)-Part 2: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Bankruptcy Improvements Act: Hearing on
S. 333 and S. 445 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); House Oversight Hearings, supra note 56.
58. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1983).
59. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 85728 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1983) [here-
inafter cited as S. 445].
60. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1983).
61. S. 445, supra note 59.
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passed the Senate the following day,6 2 but was not submitted to
the House for consideration. 63
Instead, a similar bill was introduced in the House a year
later. This bill, H.R. 5174 64-without a future income
test-contained the precise language found in the final version
of section 707(b). 5 H.R. 5174 passed the House on March 21,
1984,66 the Senate on June 19, 1984,67 and became law on July
10, 1984 as the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984.8
Section 707(b) is one of a group of provisions in the 1984 Act
designed to make the discharge of debts in bankruptcy more dif-
ficult. Chapter 7 now requires debtors to submit a schedule of
current income and expenditures,69 court clerks to apprise debt-
ors of the availability of Chapter 13 relief,70 and courts to pro-
hibit discharge of debts incurred to finance eve-of-bankruptcy
purchases. 7' The 1984 Act also prevents discharge of debts in-
curred as the result of drunk driving.7 2 It is important to under-
stand that Congress enacted section 707(b) as part of this reform
package.
III. JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS
The first step in analyzing the mechanics of section 707(b) is
to determine when the section applies. A debtor invokes section
707(b)'s jurisdiction only if his debts are "primarily consumer
debts." Once it has been determined that section 707(b) applies,
the court, "on its own motion," may inquire into potential
abuse.
62. 129 CONG. REC. S5383-88 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983).
63. In the House, however, Representative Synar, perhaps anticipating the fate of
future income in S. 445, had introduced a bankruptcy bill on March 2, 1983, which con-
tained no future income language. H.R. 1800, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
64. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1832-45 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1984).
65. See id. at H1840-41 (H.R. 5174, § 212).
66. Id. at H1854.
67. Id. at S7625 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
68. 1984 Act, supra note 1.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (Supp. II 1984).
70. Id. § 342(b).
71. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C).
72. Id. § 523(a)(9).
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A. The Jurisdictional Prerequisite: "Primarily Consumer
Debts"
Section 707(b) applies only to debtors with "primarily con-
sumer debts." A court may not dismiss a petition for "substan-
tial abuse"-or even consider the issue of "substantial
abuse"-if the debts that the debtor seeks to discharge are not
"primarily consumer debts." To determine section 707(b)'s juris-
dictional scope, the terms "consumer debts" and "primarily"
must be defined.
1. "Consumer debts"- Section 101(7) of the Bankruptcy
Code73 defines consumer debt as "debt incurred by an individual
primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose. ' 74 While
a loan for the purchase of an automobile for personal use would
be an obvious example of consumer debt, a personal judgment
for medical malpractice is an example of nonconsumer debt.
There has been no consensus on what factors should be deter-
minative in deciding whether consumer debt exists. One court
has argued that the presence of a "profit motive" should be the
critical factor. In In re Almendinger75 the court held that credit
card debts incurred by a stockbroker in an attempt to recoup
personal stock market losses were not consumer debts because a
"profit motive" was present.
In Almendinger, the debtor stockbroker listed $119,486.00 in
unsecured credit card debts. At the section 707(b) discharge
hearing, the debtor testified to significant investment losses that
he attempted to offset with cash advances from his numerous
credit cards. 76
On these facts, the court found that the debtor's obligations
were not "primarily consumer debts." Tracing the legislative
history of section 101(7), the court noted that the definition of
consumer debt comes from the use of that term in various con-
sumer protection laws. The court then stated that consumer
protection case law suggests that the presence of a "profit mo-
tive" precludes a transaction from being one for "consumer"
credit.7 8 Because the transaction in Almendinger involved a
profit motive, it was not a consumer debt.
73. Id. § 101(7) (1982).
74. Id.
75. 56 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).





The court's reasoning in this case is supported by strong pol-
icy considerations. By reading narrowly the definition of "con-
sumer debts," the court prevents the speculating debtor-here a
stockbroker chasing market losses-from characterizing his
debts as "consumer debts" and thereby triggering section
707(b)'s jurisdiction. The court in effect blocks the speculating
debtor from taking advantage of section 707(b)'s presumption
favoring discharge.
Aside from being "personal," consumer debt must be volun-
tarily "incurred" "primarily" to achieve that personal purpose.
In re White,79 holding that automobile accident liability is not
consumer debt, illustrates the significance of these definitional
terms. In that case, White, a nineteen-year-old boy, incurred a
$375,000 debt as the result of an automobile accident.80 White
filed for discharge of this debt under Chapter 7. The judgment
creditor-the accident victim and plaintiff in the case-argued
that to grant relief would constitute substantial abuse of the
Code. In her attempt to invoke section 707(b),81 the judgment
creditor further argued that because White was using his car for
personal purposes when the accident occurred, his liability for
negligent operation of the vehicle constituted a "consumer
debt."
In rejecting these arguments, the court engaged in a four-step
analysis explaining why personal injury debts are not "consumer
debts" under section 101(7). According to the court, the key
words in the definition are "incurred," "primarily," and "pur-
pose."" First, to "incur" an obligation is "to bring it down on
oneself."83 Implicit in the court's argument is the notion that the
word "incur" implies voluntary action. Second, "primarily" re-
fers to the requirement that incurrence of the debt was funda-
mental to a personal purpose.84 Third, "purpose" means having
an aim or objective.8 5 Thus, a consumer debt must have been
acquired principally to achieve a personal aim or objective.80 Be-
cause personal injury debts are not acquired to achieve a per-
79. 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985).
80. Id. at 871.
81. For a discussion of the propriety of the judgment creditor's attempt to invoke
§ 707(b), see infra text accompanying notes 104-12.
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sonal purpose, they are not "consumer debts" as that term is
defined in section 101(7).87
2. "Primarily" consumer debts- Another problem raised by
the phrase "primarily consumer debts" is the determination of
whether a debtor with many outstanding obligations has "pri-
marily" consumer debts. One court has held that a debtor has
"primarily" consumer debts when consumer debts exceed non-
consumer debts in both dollar and numerical amount. In re Bry-
ant"8 involved a debtor with substantial personal and business
debts. Bryant's consumer debts-which comprised twelve of his
sixteen obligations-totalled $46,844.97, while his nonconsumer
debts totalled only $40,248.9 On these facts, the court held that
the debts were "primarily" consumer debts."0
B. A Procedural Problem: "On [the Court's] Own Motion"
Section 707(b) states that a court, "on its own motion," may
dismiss a debtor's filing on grounds of substantial abuse. This
language raises two questions. First, how are courts supposed to
spot potential abuse at the petition stage? Second, how should
courts handle motions by parties in interest?
1. The petition stage: a procedure for initially spotting po-
tential abuse- Section 707(b) requires the court to make an in-
dependent inquiry into the existence of substantial abuse. Con-
gress, by forbidding creditors to challenge Chapter 7 filings on
grounds of substantial abuse, seemed confident in relying upon
the courts' powers of instinct and inference to weed out poten-
tial abusers. Congress did not, however, prescribe a particular
procedure for initially spotting potential abuse in bankruptcy
petitions.
87. The court adds a persuasive textual interpretation to bolster its argument that
personal injury debts are not the type with which Congess intended to deal. The court
states that the legislative history surrounding § 707(b) reflects a concern with abuse of
consumer credit. The court then notes that the 1984 Act changed the Code to make
liability for drunk driving per se nondischargeable (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (Supp. II
1984)). Congress's simultaneous silence regarding personal injury indicates an intent not
to have those debts encompassed by § 707(b) or by the Code in general. 49 Bankr. at 875.
88. 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
89. Id. at 26.
90. "The Debtor's consumer debts outweigh his non-consumer debts by more than
seven thousand dollars. . . . Similarly, with regard to number, at least twelve of the
Debtor's fifteen or sixteen obligations are consumer debts, and in this respect, also, his
case is one involving primarily consumer debts." Id.
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Judge Abram of the Southern District of New York, in In re
Edwards,1 suggests a useful procedure for handling section
707(b) cases. First, the court should closely review each bank-
ruptcy petition that it is assigned. Such review takes little time9 '
and provides a "comparison framework for [debtors'] debt, in-
come and expense data." 3 From this framework, Judge Abram
suggests, "[c]ertain petitions simply leap out as unusual."94 In
these cases, the court should issue an order to show cause why
the petition should not be dismissed.95 To obtain additional in-
formation, the court can either hold an evidentiary hearing or
ask the debtor to supply the court with written affidavits to ex-
plain why the petition in question should not be dismissed.9
Judge Abram suggests that the debtor decide whether to testify
or submit information in writing. Because written affidavits
speed up the fact-finding process, courts should probably en-
91. 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
92. Id. at 941.
93. Id.
94. Id. Judge Abram provides an example:
[Slhortly after Code § 707(b) became effective, the court reviewed a Chapter 7
petition that appeared to present an abuse. Only a single debt of several thou-
sand dollars for a student loan was listed and the stated income and expenses of
the debtor revealed no apparent reason why the debt could not be paid in full in
a matter of less than a year. An order to show cause issued for dismissal under
Code § 707(b). That petition was dismissed on the nonappearance of the debtor.
Id.
95. An example of an order to show cause is presented in In re Edwards:
"... It appearing that Code § 707(b), as amended, authorizes the bankruptcy
court, 'on its own motion and not at the request or suggestion of a party in
interest' to dismiss, after notice and a hearing a case filed by an individual
whose debts are primarily consumer debts if the court finds that the granting of
relief would be a 'substantial abuse' of Chapter 7, and
"It appearing that Code § 101(7) defines 'consumer debt' as a debt incurred by
an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purpose, and ...
"It further appearing that the Debtors have scheduled as their only debts obli-
gations of approximately $10,500 for consumer purchases and obligations of ap-
proximately $3,000 on student loans, and
"It further appearing in their schedule of current income and expenditures
that the Debtors have an annual gross income of $60,000 and a combined
monthly take-home pay of $2,550 and have no dependents, and
"It further appearing that the Debtors' estimated monthly expenditures total
$2,366, including $250 for recreation, and
"It further appearing that a budget surplus of $184 per month exists and that
the Debtors have otherwise made no showing of why they are unable to make
periodic payments on their debts, it is therefore
"ORDERED that the Debtors... show cause before the undersigned... why
an order should not be entered dismissing their Chapter 7 petition on the
grounds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions
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courage debtors to submit information in this form. Because the
"notice and hearing" language in section 707(b) refers only to
the hearing in which the court ultimately decides the substantial
abuse issue, and not to any intermediate evidentiary hearings,
this procedure would not violate the statutory prescription.
Under this procedure, the court assumes the burden of pro-
curing additional information from the debtor. This task seems
required by the statutory presumption in section 707(b) in favor
of granting the debtor the relief that he requests. 9 7 Such an ap-
proach to section 707(b) cases provides a fair, uniform, and effi-
cient system,98 and also appears to comport with congressional
intent for the operation of this section.99
2. Motions by "part[ies] in interest"- The statutory lan-
97. "There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. II 1984).
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 governs presumptions and states that "a presumption
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evi-
dence to rebut or meet the presumption." Thus, the court satisfies its prescribed burden
by initiating an inquiry into potential abuse.
98.
The court is satisfied that the initiation of an inquiry by way of its own motion
and subsequent receipt from a debtor of a written response to the points noted
by the court, in addition to any testimony the debtor wishes to give, would satis-
factorily enable the court to render a fair and prompt decision.
In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 942 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
99. See id. ("This is the procedure that the court perceives Congress envisioned for it
to employ under Code § 707(b)."); see also S. 445, supra note 59. S. 445, a bill passed by
the Senate but not considered by the House, contained the following section:
Prior to dismissing any Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse, the court shall set
forth, in writing within twenty days of the permanent designation of relief made
by the debtor.., its reasons for finding that substantial abuse would occur; and
the court shall, at the same time, advise the debtor of his right to respond in
writing and/or to request and secure a hearing on the court's findings. The court
shall establish, by rule, time limits for the debtor's response and for the court's
written findings in response thereto. No creditor or representative of a creditor
may participate in judicial proceedings relating to substantial abuse except upon
the request of the court.
Id. § 203(a).
The above-cited language did not make it into the final version of § 707(b), but the
reason for this is unclear. Unlike the overt hostility to the future income language con-
tained in the original version of S. 445, there seems to have been no opposition to this
suggested procedural subsection. Although Congress considered this procedural language
and never enacted it, there does not seem to be any particular policy reason behind
Congress's deletion.
There are two ways to interpret Congress's deletion. First, one could argue that the
fact that Congress considered the section and did not enact it is prima facie evidence
that congressional intent was against such a procedural scheme. On the other hand, one
could argue that the absence of explicit hostility to the procedural scheme suggests a
nonsubstantive (i.e., administrative) reason for deletion of the language. If one accepts
the latter interpretation as more logical than the former, then the procedural scheme
outlined supra in the text accompanying notes 91-97 arguably comports with congres-
sional intent.
Section 707(b)
guage prohibiting motions by interested parties raises two ques-
tions. First, who is a party in interest? Second, how should
courts respond to motions or other suggestions by interested
parties?
The most obvious examples of parties in interest are creditors.
Creditors lose their money upon the discharge of a debtor's obli-
gations and thus have an interest in demonstrating substantial
abuse. For this reason, courts are typically most hostile towards
motions from creditors of a consumer debtor. In In re Chris-
tian,10 for example, a creditor bank brought a motion request-
ing the court to hold a hearing to determine whether an individ-
ual debtor's petition should be dismissed for substantial abuse.
The court rejected the motion, stating: "[I]f this creditor were
permitted to dismiss a Chapter 7 proceeding ... the floodgates
could open every time there is an adversary proceeding concern-
ing the dischargeability of a debt or the granting of a
discharge."101
Other types of parties may also qualify as parties in interest.
For example, the court in In re Christian was also forced to de-
cide whether a United States Trustee is an "interested party"
for purposes of section 707(b).10 1 Holding in the affirmative, the
court pointed out that the United States Trustee is often called
upon to protect the estate against the debtor or vice versa, mak-
ing the Trustee an interested party.'
A more troubling question is what courts should do when in-
terested parties "suggest" potential abuse-either by making a
motion in disregard of section 707(b), or by hinting in a less di-
rect fashion that discharge is inappropriate. Although the statu-
tory language prohibits such motions, it does not preclude a
court, after rejecting the motion, from inquiring into the possi-
bility of substantial abuse. There are several possible responses
100. 51 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
101. Id. at 120.
102. A United States Trustee is not the same thing as a Chapter 7 or 13 trustee.
According to Professor White: "The United States Trustee establishes and supervises a
panel of private trustees for Chapter 7 cases, and appoints or serves as a Chapter 13
standing trustee. The U.S. trustee also appoints Chapter 11 trustees, creditor's commit-
tees and examiners, and conducts investigations to ensure that participants in bank-
ruptcy cases are not avoiding the requirements of the Code." J.J. WHITFE, supra note 10,
at 51; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589 (1982).
103.
It is clear that the trustee is a party in interest who is looking for that which will
preserve the estate as against the debtor in some situations, in favor of the
debtor in other situations. The role may change. The trustee is not guilty of a
conflict, but is a party in interest.
In re Christian, 51 Bankr. at 119 (emphasis in original).
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to such motions.
One possible response is to prevent the court from looking
into substantial abuse and to require discharge of the debtor's
obligations.10 4 Such a prophylactic rule provides a strong disin-
centive to creditors to bring motions of this type. Because credi-
tors are aware of the statutory prohibition, a strong deterrent is
appropriate. This rule would also comport with the congres-
sional intent to keep the bankruptcy process inexpensive and
free of creditor harassment. 105 The problem with this rigid ap-
proach, however, is that it often could result in the discharge of
debts in petitions that should be dismissed. Because this ap-
proach would mandate an automatic discharge of debts upon the
filing of a creditor motion, regardless of whether such discharge
would constitute substantial abuse, it could often lead to anoma-
lous results.106 Such an approach might also encourage creditors
to resort to surreptitious means to call the court's attention to
potential abuse.107
Another possible response would allow motions by interested
parties despite the statutory prohibition against them. Under
this approach, courts would recognize the motions and examine
more closely the petitions in question. Such an approach maxi-
104. In fact, this approach was endorsed by Senator Metzenbaum when the 1984 Act
was passed. See 130 CONG. REC. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) ("If a creditor asks a
court to dismiss a case claiming that there has been substantial abuse of [the bankruptcy
laws by the debtor,] the court would not be allowed ... to do so.") (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum); see also In re Jones, 60 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986) (holding a
motion by a creditor's attorney as "initiated at the suggestion of a party in interest and
hence, precluded from consideration by that very provision it seeks to invoke").
105. See 130 CONG. REc. S7624-25 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) ("Only a bankruptcy
court, acting on its own initiative, could dismiss a case involving substantial abuse. This
will preclude creditors from making bankruptcy too expensive for the debtor by filing
harassing motions alleging substantial abuse.") (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
106. The court in In re Hudson, 56 Bankr. 415, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), modi-
fied in part, 64 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986), states:
While it appears that the provisions of Section 707(b) should be given their ordi-
nary and plain meaning, to do so is to present the Court with a practical diffi-
culty in the event a party-in-interest should bring a case to the Court's atten-
tion. On one hand, the Court may not act pursuant to Section 707(b) if a case
has been brought to its attention by a party-in-interest. On the other hand, the
Court cannot ignore information which has been brought before it, regardless of
how the information was obtained. If a rule were devised, whereby a Court could
not act pursuant to Section 707(b) if a case was called to the Court's attention
by a party-in-interest, such a rule would have a deterrent effect on the parties
who would otherwise make this information available. However, it would also
have the effect of preventing the Court from acting in cases where an abuse of
Title 11 Chapter 7 is most likely to be occurring.
107. One can envision ingenious creditors placing anonymous phone calls to law
clerks or slipping notes under chambers' doors in the dead of night advising the court to
check John Doe's file for substantial abuse.
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mizes the court's opportunity for spotting abuse, particularly if a
court has many petitions and the creditors act in good faith. At
least one court has endorsed this approach, arguing that "Con-
gress has authorized the Courts to challenge cases in which
abuse is suspected."108 The court held that unless a party in in-
terest repeatedly or intentionally violates the limits of section
707(b), it would not refuse to hear such motions.'09 Such an ap-
proach, however, flagrantly violates the proscriptive language of
section 707(b). Because creditors would have nothing to lose by
filing motions under such a rule, the rule would encourage ha-
rassment, and should therefore be rejected.
An ideal response to creditor motions would both deter such
motions and still permit the court to dismiss a petition for sub-
stantial abuse. Therefore, a court, after rejecting a creditor's mo-
tion, should inquire into substantial abuse at its own discretion,
but assess costs-including attorney's fees-against the mov-
ant."10 The court's discretion can be guided by its initial judg-
ment under Judge Abram's procedure for initially spotting
abuse,"' and the penalty of attorney's fees finds support in a
closely related section of the Bankruptcy Code.1' This interme-
108. In re Hudson, 56 Bankr. at 420.
This Court cannot sanction flagrant violations of the restrictions which limit
parties-in-interest from suggesting the review of a case for dismissal under Sec-
tion 707(b). However, this Court also cannot sanction abuse of Chapter 7, partic-
ularly when Congress has authorized the Courts to challenge cases in which
abuse is suspected. If given the choice as to which of these violations should be




[T]his Court must conclude that unless a party or their counsel flagrantly, inten-
tionally, or repeatedly violate the limitations under 11 U.S.C. Section 707(b), the
Court will not necessarily be precluded from dismissing a case pursuant to 11
U.S.C. Section 707(b), despite the fact that a party-in-interest brought to light
information which subjects a case to scrutiny under that section.
Id.
110. Assessment of costs in this situation is supported by other sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that call for assessment of costs against creditors who act in bad faith. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982) (awarding either damages proximately caused by bad faith
filing or punitive damages).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (Supp. II 1984):
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt
under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court
shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable
attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the court finds that the position of the credi-
tor was not substantially justified, except that the court shall not award such
costs and fees if special circumstances would make the award unjust.
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diate approach protects creditors by not foreclosing inquiry and
protects debtors by providing a deterrent to harassing motions.
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR DETERMINING SUBSTANTIAL
ABUSE
Perhaps the most important and controversial question arising
from the language of section 707(b) concerns the definition of
"substantial abuse." If an individual debtor has "primarily con-
sumer debts," a court "on its own motion" may dismiss a
debtor's petition for Chapter 7 relief if granting discharge would
constitute "substantial abuse" of the Bankruptcy Code. This
Part argues that courts should find substantial abuse if the
debtor acts in bad faith or is able to repay 100% of his debts
within three years after his motion for bankruptcy.
A. Bad Faith
That bad faith on the part of a debtor should preclude dis-
charge finds support in the origins and purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The bankruptcy courts have their foundation in
the Courts of Equity where the "clean hands" doctrine strictly
applies.11 To receive equity, a debtor must act equitably
himself.114
Thus, when debtors file petitions in bad faith under Chapters
7, 11, or 13, courts will often deny relief to protect the integrity
of the bankruptcy courts.115 Judge Ordin, a California bank-
ruptcy judge, has argued that a debtor's good faith is a prerequi-
site to relief."" Courts have denied relief for (1) successive
113. The Supreme Court noted in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939), that "a
bankruptcy court is a court of equity." See also Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the
Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAW. 1795, 1797 (1983) (discussing bankruptcy
courts' "general equitable powers").
114. See In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984) ("To receive equity,
one must do equity.").
115. See Ordin, supra note 113, at 1796.
116.
Jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy court, articulated in terms of good
faith, is often expressed as a threshold test to ensure that the legal status and
economic condition of the debtor are within the jurisdictional grant, contempla-
tion, and purpose of [the Code]....
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court is said to have the inherent discretionary
power to prevent the continuation of a proceeding where the court perceives an
intent to abuse the purpose of the Code....
The good faith inquiry will often focus on conduct of a debtor in the context
of candor, frankness, sincerity, and willingness to do equity, which are said to be
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filings;' 17 (2) failure to supply financial data;11 8 (3) lack of com-
pliance with court orders;1  (4) protection of preferences;1 20 (5)
fraudulent transfers;1 21 (6) concealment of assets; 122 (7) filing for
ulterior motives such as delay, 23 avoidance of contractual obli-
gations,1 24 or reclamation of assets;"' (8) failure to list truthfully
all obligations and monthly expenses; 2 and (9) for seeking to
maintain an exorbitant lifestyle at creditors' expense.1 27 There-
fore, when a debtor exhibits bad faith in filing a Chapter 7 peti-
tion, the court should deny discharge under section 707(b) on
the theory that discharging a bad-faith petition would amount
to "substantial abuse" of the Code.
B. The 100%/Three Years Test
This section argues that courts should also look to a debtor's
future income to determine whether granting discharge consti-
tutes "substantial abuse" of the Code. After establishing the ar-
guments in favor of examining future income, this section sug-
gests that whenever a debtor can repay 100% of his debts over
the three-year period after filing, the debtor's petition for dis-
charge should be dismissed for "substantial abuse" of the Code.
the indicia of good faith. In contrast, manipulative use of the letter of the stat-
ute for an ulterior motive or purpose is interdicted.
Id. at 1796-97 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1798-99.
118. Id. at 1799-1800.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1800-01.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1808-11.
124. Id. at 1804-08.
125. Id. at 1802-03.
126. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
127. "[lit was not the design of the Bankruptcy laws to allow the Debtor to lead the
life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his behalf." Id. at 26; see also In re Grant, 51
Bankr. 385, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (denial of Chapter 7 relief for couple who have
"at no point in their recent history . . . displayed a sincere resolve to tighten their
belts").
The court in In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 26, rejected a debtor's petition for Chapter 7
relief, stating:
[I]n light of the Debtor's... fraudulent and misleading omissions in his petition;
his attempts to pad his expenses statement in order to misrepresent his financial
position; and the relatively exorbitant lifestyle which he seeks to maintain while
taking shelter from his creditors under the Bankruptcy provisions, the Court
concludes that to allow this petition would be a substantial abuse of the provi-
sions of Chapter 7.
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1. Policy arguments supporting a future income standard-
Courts have been interpreting section 707(b) to mandate an ex-
amination of debtors' future income. 28 This section examines
the arguments for and against considering "future income" and
suggests that future income be considered as part of a substan-
tial abuse determination.
There are two principal arguments against applying a "future
income" standard under section 707(b). First, a narrow reading
of the legislative history militates against the consideration of
"future income." Because Congress considered the future in-
come language and chose not to adopt it, principles of statutory
interpretation suggest that courts should not consider such a
standard.1 29 In fact, at least one senator has explicitly stated
that this interpretation is the proper one to be accorded section
707(b).180 Second, as Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum
stressed during Senate hearings, a future income test might de-
grade the debtor by forcing him to prove that he is too poor to
enter a repayment plan, s1 impose high administrative burdens
on bankruptcy courts,"3 2 and create perverse incentives for both
debtors and creditors.133
These arguments, however, can each be effectively countered
by arguments supporting the use of a future income standard.
First, the fact that "future income" language existed in early
bills and was later deleted does not conclusively establish that
Congress intended courts to disregard a debtor's future income
when deciding whether substantial abuse has occurred. There is
no explanation of why the future income language was deleted.
128. See In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) ("It follows from
the floor debates [of H.R. 1800] that due attention must be paid to the future income
potential of the debtor to determine to what extent debts may be repaid."); In re Ed-
wards, 50 Bankr. 933, 937 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Both the legislative background
to adoption of Code § 707(b) and the creditor protections against bankruptcy abuse long
found in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code have caused the Court to determine that
the debtor's future ability to pay is the proper focus of Code § 707(b)."); see also In re
Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (ability to repay is "primary if not
exclusive, factor").
129. Such a rejection "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a
result that it expressly declined to enact." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186, 200 (1974).
130. "I cannot tell how pleased I am that both the House and Senate have agreed to
the total elimination of the future income language. Under H.R. 5174, the availability of
bankruptcy relief would not be limited by a future earnings standard." 130 CONG. REC.
S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
131. 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 49 (minority views of Sen. Metzenbaum and Sen.
Kennedy on S. 2000).
132. Id. at 50.
133. Id. at 62.
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When interpreting a code section in the absence of an explicit
congressional statement of purpose, one must look to the cir-
cumstances and context of the provision's passage to shed light
on its meaning.
Section 707(b) was enacted as part of a series of provisions
designed to make it more difficult for debtors to discharge their
debts.'3 4 The tone of the 1984 amendments indicates a strict
congressional attitude toward debtors. The 1984 Act contains a
number of pro-creditor amendments that reflect the credit in-
dustry's attempts to force debtors into mandatory Chapter 13.' 35
As a result of the 1984 amendments, not only must bankruptcy
clerks'3 6 and debtors' attorneys 3 7 inform petitioners that they
may proceed under either Chapter 7 or 13, but also, debtors
must acknowledge that they are aware of each form of relief
available under the Code.' 38 Other pro-creditor 1984 amend-
ments include the nondischargeability of debts for luxury goods
or services created by eve-of-bankruptcy purchases'39 and the
prohibition against discharge of drunk driving judgments. 4 '
These amendments are all pro-creditor in tone, and it is logical
to interpret section 707(b), enacted as part of the same reform
package, as reflecting the same pro-creditor tone.
More specifically, the 1984 amendment requiring each debtor
to submit a schedule of current income and expenditures 4' indi-
cates that Congress must have intended the courts to use the
earning potential of the debtor as a yardstick to measure sub-
stantial abuse under section 707(b). Otherwise, the current in-
come requirement would have no purpose. Congress could not
have required debtors to file current income statements and in-
tended that courts not consider such information.' 2
134. See J.J. WHITE, supra note 10, at 30-31: "[Tlhe 1984 amendments modestly re-
stricted the rights of consumer debtors ......
135. Id. at 364-66.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 342 (Supp. II 1984).
137. See R. AARON, supra note 9, § 13.01[2].
138. Id.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1984).
140. Id. § 523(a)(9).
141. Id. § 521(1).
142.
The amendment to section 521 requiring filing a statement of current income
and expenditures compliments [sic] the amendment to section 707. It is from
this statement that the court may deem whether the debtor will have sufficient
income to repay a meaningful part of the debts. If that is the situation, the court
may then find that use of chapter 7 would constitute a substantial abuse of its
provisions.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 707.02, at 707-7 to -8 (15th ed. 1986).
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Second, as Judge Abram points out in In re Edwards,143 prior
to the adoption of section 707(b), courts, trustees, and creditors
enjoyed a variety of specific weapons designed to combat specific
forms of abuse."44 Section 523 provides a laundry list of debts
that cannot be discharged.' 45 Section 727 prevents discharge of
debts that are connected with fraudulent transactions. 14" Section
362(b)(1) prevents a debtor from obtaining relief from the ef-
fects of criminal conduct."17 Each of these sections is narrowly
tailored to prevent a specific form of abuse. The fact that other
bankruptcy sections are narrowly tailored to deal with specific
abuses makes it likely that section 707(b) is likewise designed to
prevent a particular type of abuse.
Congress, before passing section 707(b), heard voluminous tes-
timony regarding the ability of many debtors to repay substan-
tial portions of their debts from future income. ' 48 The logical in-
ference from the fact that Congress heard such testimony and
then enacted section 707(b) is that the section must have been
designed, in part, to combat this newly perceived problem. In-
deed, it is difficult to determine a different congressional intent
behind section 707(b) other than to prevent the discharge of
debts when the debtor's future income is sufficient to repay
those debts. Because Code provisions were already in place to
143. 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
144. Id. at 937 n.3.
145.
Code § 523 specifies types of debts which may not be discharged. Three of the
exceptions require creditor action to preserve; if the creditor fails to act
promptly these types of debts are discharged. The balance of the exceptions to
discharge do not require affirmative creditor action and are automatic. The three
requiring creditor action are Code § 523(a)(2) (the fraud or false pretense or
false financial statement exception), § 523(a)(4) (the fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny exception) and




Code § 727 provides a number of grounds on which objection may be made to
the debtor's discharge generally. If one of the specified grounds is proven the
debtor receives no discharge at all. Most of the grounds relate to conduct in
connection with the bankruptcy case itself, such as knowingly and fraudulently
making a false oath in connection with the case (Code § 727(a)(4)), failing to
obey a lawful order (Code § 727(a)(6)), destroying, falsifying or failing without
justification to keep books and records from which the debtor's financial affairs
might be ascertained (Code § 727(a)(3)).
Id.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see, e.g., In re Hansen, 48 Bankr.
107 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985) (denial of debtor's attempt to enjoin further bad check
prosecution).
148. See supra note 57.
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curb bad faith on the debtor's part,"' 9 section 707(b) must have
been designed to cure a specific form of bad faith, namely dis-
charge of debts when future income would have been sufficient
to repay the obligations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are strong policy
considerations that support the use of future income in the
"substantial abuse" determination. The language of section
707(b) is probably best understood when viewed as the result of
political compromise. Congress was divided on the issue of fu-
ture income. 150 This section reflects that division. Section 707(b)
is vaguely worded, procedurally bizarre, and of very little guid-
ance to the courts. Because the text of the section itself is not
clear and because the legislative history is inconclusive, policy
considerations must be examined to make sense of section
707(b).
There are three strong policy reasons for adopting a future in-
come standard. First, it seems unfair, if not absurd, to allow dis-
charge when a debtor has sufficient income to repay his debts.
Second, because creditors look to debtors' future income when
making loan decisions,15' it seems logical to allow courts to look
to a debtor's future income when determining whether discharge
would constitute a "substantial abuse" of the Code. Third, al-
lowing courts to examine a debtor's future income encourages
debtors to repay their obligations to the extent they are able to
do so.' 52
Even if a strict construction of the legislative history militates
against considering future income, courts should rely on the
traditional principles of equity to prevent a debtor from dis-
charging his debts when he can afford to repay them without
significant burden. Any hardships engendered by such a policy
can be accommodated by the specific standard.
2. The proposed standard- After deciding to consider fu-
ture income in a substantial abuse hearing, a court must promul-
gate a specific standard to decide how much weight to give to a
debtor's future income. The "100% over three years" rule that is
advocated here is suggested by Judge Abram in In re Ed-
wards.15  This standard prevents the discharge of a consumer
149. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); id. § 1129(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984)
(allowing court to confirm a Chapter 11 plan only if the plan "has been proposed in good
faith").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 35-68.
151. See supra note 46.
152. See supra note 47.
153. 50 Bankr. 933, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("This court has determined that it is
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debtor's obligations under Chapter 7 if the debtor can repay
100% of his debts within the three years following his filing.
This rule sets a "rather high screening standard,"1 " but can be
justified on a number of grounds.
First, a per se test is easy to understand and to apply.15 A
uniform standard applied consistently in every case promotes
certainty and prevents unequal treatment among debtors.
Second, the specific "100% over three years" test is supported
by the findings of the Purdue Study.56 This report, used by the
consumer credit industry to lobby Congress for tighter restric-
tions on debtors, concluded that as many as 30% of all debtors
could repay 100% of their debts over three years.1 57
Third, the standard accounts for the realities of the filing pro-
cess. At the time of initiating an inquiry into potential abuse,158
the court can only make preliminary guesses as to a debtor's
ability to repay his debts. 59 Debtors will file additional informa-
tion, usually disclosing greater expenses and lower income. 60
Thus if the court set a lower threshold test than "100% over
three years," it might have to dismiss many of its inquiries, a
procedure "unlikely to encourage greater respect for the bank-
ruptcy system."' 61
Fourth, the "100% over three years" test accommodates ob-
jections to a future income standard that were voiced during the
hearings on section 707(b). Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum
expressed concern that low income families and victims of un-
foreseen financial reversal would be prejudiced by a future in-
reasonable to conclude that a debtor whose income and reasonable expenses indicate
that he could pay over three years an amount equal to 100% of the principal owed to his
creditors is not suffering from sufficient economic hardship to warrant use of Chapter
7.") (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 938.
155. Id.
156. 1 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT,
PURDUE UNIV., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY, CONSUMERS' RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY: ORI-
GINS AND EFFECTS (1982) (Monograph No. 23); 2 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIV., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY, PER-
SONAL BANKRUPTCY: CAUSES. COSTS AND BENEFITS (1982) (Monograph No. 24).
157. The results of the Purdue Study have been sharply criticized. See Sullivan,
Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the
Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091. For a rejoinder, see Sullivan, Reply: Limiting
Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1069. For a surrejoinder, see Sulli-
van, Warren & Westbrook, Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 1087.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.





come test. But the requirement that the debtor have sufficient
income to repay 100% of his debts prevents hardship on debtors
who are able to repay a substantial percentage-60% for exam-
ple-but who would be unable to repay the other 40% if their
petitions were dismissed. The "100% over three years" standard
thus differs from the harsher standards proposed in various con-
gressional bills in that only those debtors who meet the rather
high initial threshold are subject to the penalty of dismissal.'6 2
The Senators also claimed that a future income test would
burden the courts.'13 In fact, Senator Metzenbaum believes that
the 1984 Act forecloses inquiries by courts into future income
and that such foreclosure benefits courts.' 6" These arguments,
however, are outweighed by two important factors. First, be-
cause bankruptcy judges see many petitions, they can compe-
tently determine those debtors seeking to abuse the system. One
judge's experience indicates that potential abuse "leaps out" at
the court.' 65 Second, the debtor provides the court with the raw
data. Therefore the court does not actually have to speculate on
the possibility of abuse. Rather, the court need only examine the
information that the debtor has provided.
Finally, the statutory presumption in favor of granting the
debtor the relief that he requests is accommodated by the pro-
posed standard. When a debtor files his petition for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7, courts must assume that the debtor is entitled
to discharge unless evidence is discovered to rebut such an as-
sumption. Under the proposed standard, the fact that a debtor
can repay 100% of his debts over three years should serve as
sufficient evidence to rebut the a priori presumption that the
debtor is entitled to relief.
162. See, e.g., S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 127 CONG. REc. 32,195 (1981)
(preventing a debtor from obtaining discharge under Chapter 7, when a reasonable por-
tion of his prepetition debts could be paid out of anticipated future income). According
to the drafters of S. 2000, 75% was clearly reasonable and 25% was clearly unreasonable.
See 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 37. Thus, S. 2000, had it been enacted, would have
created a harsher standard than the one that this Note proposes.
163. 1982 S. REP., supra note 36, at 59-62.
164.
The credit industry wanted us to force debtors to prove that they could not
pay 50 percent of their debt over a period of 3 to 5 years in order to qualify for
bankruptcy relief. I thought that was a terrible idea. It would have forced bank-
ruptcy judges to become soothsayers and engage in the impossible task of pre-
dicting someone's earnings and financial obligations. Bankruptcy relief would
have become hostage to a judge's guesses about how much an individual would
earn, what their [sic] financial burdens would be, whether they would become
sick, unemployed, and so on.
130 CONG. REC. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
165. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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CONCLUSION
Under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court must
deny a debtor's petition for discharge if granting the petition
would constitute "substantial abuse" of the Code. This Note
provides a framework for interpreting section 707(b). When ana-
lyzing the section in the context of a discharge proceeding, the
first question a court should ask is whether 707(b) applies. The
section's jurisdictional reach extends only to those debtors who
have "primarily consumer debts." If the court determines that
section 707(b) applies, the second step is to comply with the sec-
tion's unusual procedural scheme. The procedural scheme is
strange in that the court is supposed to investigate potential
abuse on its own initiative. Despite the statutory language, this
Note argues that if an interested party makes a motion to alert
the court to potential abuse, the court, after assessing costs
against the movant, should look into the possibility of abuse at
its own discretion. Finally, when determining whether granting
discharge would constitute "substantial abuse" of the Code, the
court should examine a debtor's future income. Under the stan-
dard proposed by this Note, if the debtor can repay 100% of his
debts within three years after filing, or if he acts in bad faith,
the court should deny the debtor's petition for discharge.
-David L. Balser
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